“Internalizing Public Disputes: The Rise of China’s Administrative Reconsideration Under Xi“
Jiajun Luo (PhD 2025)
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law
Published online: June 2025
Abstract: This article examines the strategic shift in China’s public dispute resolution under Xi Jinping, marked by the elevation of administrative reconsideration over judicial review as the primary and preferred channel for resolving disputes between citizens and government agencies. The 2023 Administrative Reconsideration Law institutionalizes recent reform efforts, formalizing its role as a more flexible, efficient, and internally dispute resolution alternative to litigation. These changes support the Party’s vision of self-regulation within the bureaucracy and reduced dependency on courts, by bolstering administrative reconsideration’s procedural efficiency and institutional powerbase to review both legality and reasonableness of administrative actions. However, despite increased case volume, administrative reconsideration in China continues to face challenges, including bureaucratic resistance that limits its effectiveness in addressing citizen grievances. Moreover, although agency review aligns with the Party’s preference for concentrated power and minimal public scrutiny, judicial review and petitioning remain entrenched avenues for public dispute resolution. Ultimately, this internal approach reflects Xi’s vision of rule of law, in which public grievances are managed within the administration to project an image of an omnipotent state, capable of self-correcting governance issues. Rooted in China’s paternalistic tradition, administrative reconsideration embodies a broader theme to portrays the regime as a benevolent authority that resolves disputes on behalf of the public, rather than empowering individuals to address them independently.